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LEGISLATIVE COMMENTS
SENTENCING IN CRIMINAL CASES: HOW GREAT THE
NEED FOR REFORM?
Anthony P. Giorno*
Where law ends, discretion begins, and the exercise of discretion
may mean either beneficence or tyranny, either justice or injustice,
either reasonableness or arbitrariness.'
I.

INTRODUCTION

For many years, the sentencing process of the criminal justice
system sought to achieve four goals: deterrence, rehabilitation, incapacitation of the offender, and retribution for society and the vic-

tim.2 The achievement of these goals was implemented in the major-

ity of jurisdictions through imposition of an indeterminate sentence
and discretionary release by an administrative body-traditionally
a parole board. This approach allowed courts to announce relatively
long sentences as a deterrent to future criminal behavior and to
placate the victim and society, but tempered the punishment by
allowing early release on an individual basis as soon as the offender
had been rehabilitated.
Recently, however, the system has been called into question.'
Given the broad range of penalties and other sentencing options
* B.A., George Mason University, 1973; J.D., College of William and Mary, 1976. Presently, Assistant Commonwealth's Attorney for Patrick County, Virginia.
1. K. DAvis, DisCRmnONARY JUsT: A PRELMNARY INQUmY 3 (1969).
2. The American Bar Association has proposed that all of these goals are legitimately
considered in an appropriate case. PROJECT ON STANARDS FOR CRAsINAL JUsTIcE, ABA, STANDARDS RELATING TO SENTENCING ALTERNATIVES AND PROCEDUREs § 2.2 (1968). See also, NATIONAL

CoUNc-. ON Camr AND DELNQUENCY MODEL SENTENCING ACT (1972 Revision); NATIONAL ADviSORY COMMISSION ON CRnINAL JUSTICE STAND~s AND GOALS, CORRECIONS STAMARD 5.2

(1973).
3. See, e.g., Atschuler, Sentencing Reform and ProsecutorialPower: A Critique of Recent
Proposalsfor "Fixed" and "Presumptive" Sentencing, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 550 (1978); Cassou
and Taugher, Determinative Sentencing in California:The New Numbers Game, 9 PAC. L.
REV. 5 (1978); Evans and Gilbert, The Case for Judicial Discretion in Sentencing, 61
JUDICATURE 66 (1977).
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available to a court, it often happens that two defendants charged
with the same offense in different jurisdictions, or within the same
jurisdiction, receive widely disparate sentences. 4 As the public has
become more aware of cases of seemingly unjustifiable disparity5 in
sentencing, their confidence in the ability of the criminal justice
system to deal justly with those who come before it has diminished.
Unjustifiable disparity in sentencing creates problems in the correctional system as well: prisoners convicted of the same offense often
find that they have received different sentences and, if they feel they
have been treated unjustly, they become hostile and more difficult
to rehabilitate.
The movement to rectify perceived injustices of the sentencing
process has been sounded by legislators, jurists,' legal. scholars, and
members of the bar of the several states. Their purpose has been to
bring a degree of uniformity to sentencing and thereby assure that
all offenders are treated equally by the courts. This article will
examine and evaluate some of the more innovative approaches to
sentencing reform from the perspective of the criminal trial lawyer.
II.

TRENDS IN

SENTENCING

REFORM'

At least forty states and the federal government utilize what is
known as indeterminate sentencing. The sentencing authority, be it
4. A definite geographic disparity exists in Virginia for certain crimes. For example, the
average sentence for robbery from October, 1973 to October, 1976 in Alexandria was 7 years,
2 months, but in Portsmouth the average was 15 years, 3 months. In Bedford, the average
sentence for robbery was 32 years, 2 months. 1977 VA. STATE CRIME COMM'N ANN. REP. 88-89.
5. In a broad sense, the term "unjustifiable disparity" is used to refer to differences in
sentencing based upon unarticulated factors or from attaching a different weight to the same
factor in two or more cases. J. MrrFoRD, KIND AND USUAL PUNISHMENT: THE PRISONER BusmEsS
(1973). In more narrow terms, "unjustifiable disparity" refers to differences in sentencing
growing out of the biases or prejudices of an individual judge as opposed to different attitudes
toward criminals and crime from one community to another. Whether disparity growing out
of the latter factor is "unjustifiable" is a matter of debate.
6. Chief Justice Warren Burger, in delivering his State of the Judici.ry Address to the
American Bar Association National Conference in Atlanta, remarked: "No one can examine
from a national perspective, or even the over-all perspective within one district or one metropolitan area, the sentences of individual judges without being deeply concerned about seeming disparities." 65 A.B.A.J. 358, 360 (1979).
7. For an excellent overview of the predominant features of the major determinate sentencing proposals, see, Kneedler, Sentencing in Criminal Cases: Time for Reform, 55 U. VA.
NEWSLTrER 17 (Jan. 1979).
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judge or jury, is vested with wide discretion in setting punishment.
However, the actual time served by the prisoner often bears little
resemblance to the sentence imposed. Once an individual is committed to the correctional system, his actual release date is set by
an administrative body-typically a parole board. A prisoner first
becomes eligible for parole after serving some fractional portion of
his sentence; on the average, one-fourth of the active term imposed.
The character and background of the defendant play a large role not
only in terms of the actual punishment imposed, but also in the
parole board's determination of when he will actually be released on
parole. Although general statutory guidelines govern the granting or
denial of parole, the board is vested with a great deal of discretion
in determining when to release an individual offender.
Proposals for reform have centered on what may be classified as
determinate sentencing. Unlike the indeterminate system, which
focuses on the characteristics of the individual offender, determinate sentencing is "offense oriented." Specifically rejecting the rehabilitation of the offender as a goal of the sentencing process 8 the
theory is that each offense should merit the same punishment regardless of the individual character traits of the offender.
There are two major subcategories of determinate sentencing. The
first is so-called flat sentencing, already adopted in at least two
states.' This system allows the sentencing authority a wide range of
discretion in imposing sentence up to a statutory maximum. However, discretionary release is abolished and, with the exception of
statutorily mandated good time credits, the offender serves the en8. Authority for the shift away from rehabilitation as the theoretical basis of sentencing

may be found in the following publications: AMERICAN

FRIENDS SERVICE COMMTrEE, STRUGGLE
FOR JUSTICE (1971); CrrIzENs INQUIRY ON PAROLE AND CRMINAL JUSTICE, INC., PRISONS WITHOUT
WALLS: REPORT ON NEW YORK PAROLE (1975); D. FOGEL, WE ARE TmE LIVING PROOF (1975); M.
FRANKEL, CRI[NAL SENT.ENCES: LAW WITHOUT ORDER (1973); D. LIPTON, R. MARTINSON & J.
WiLKS, THE EFmFECTVEsS OF CORRECTIONAL TREATmFNT (1975); N. MoRIus, THE FUTURE OF
IMPRISONMENT (1974); TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND TASK FORCE ON CRIMINAL SENTENCING, FAIR
AND CERTAIN PUNISHMENT (1976); A. VON HIRSCH, DoING JUsTICE: THE CHOICE OF PUNImIEmNTS.
(1976); J. WILSON, THINKING ABOUT CRiME (1975); Harris, Disquisitionon the Need for a New

Model for Criminal SanctioningSystems, 77 W. VA. L. REV. 263 (1975); McGee, A New Look
at Sentencing: PartI, 38 FED. PROBATION 3 (June, 1974); McGee, A New Look at Sentencing:
PartII, 38 FED. PROBATION 3 (Sept., 1974).
9. ME. REV. STAT. tit. 17-A, §§ 1253-54 (1977); IND. CODE: ANN. §§ 35-50.2-3 et. seq. (Bums
1979).
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tire term imposed. The second approach, presumptive sentencing,
has been enacted in six states,"0 and was recently proposed for adoption in Virginia." This system contemplates the legislative or administrative promulgation of sentencing guidelines and a presumptively proper sentence for each offense. Each category of crime is
assigned a specific punishment which may be reduced or enhanced
by the sentencing authority only in extraordinary circumstances.
Discretionary release through parole or the suspension of sentences
is prohibited, and the prisoner serves the entire term imposed subject only to good time credit. 2

II. THE VIRGINIA PRESUMPTIV SENTENCING AcT-AN OVERVIEW
Present Virginia law establishes six classes of felonies and four
classes of misdemeanors and prescribes maximum and minimum
punishments for each category. 3 The judge or jury is directed to
impose a penalty within the permissible range of punishment."
The proposed Virginia Presumptive Sentencing Act (VPSA), on
the other hand, would provide only maximum punishments, with
two or three separate series of maximum sentences for each offense. 5 The lowest tier of maximum sentences would be for the
ordinary criminal offense and be classified in accordance with Virginia classification for felonies and misdemeanors. In limited cases,
in which an offender has a long history of prior convictions or has
10. California, CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 1170-1170.6 (West Cum. Supp. 1979); Illinois, Act of
July 26, 1972, P.A. 77-2097, ILL. ANN. STAT., ch. 38 § 1005-8-1 (Smith-Hurd, 1979); Indiana,
IND. CODE ANN. §§ 35-50-1-1-35-50-6-6 (Bums Cum. Supp. 1979); Minnesota, MINN. STAT.
ANN. §§ 244.01-.11 (West Cum. Supp. 1979); Oregon, OR. REv. STAT. §§ 144.775-144.790
(1977); Pennsylvania, 18 PA. CoNs. STAT. §§ 1381-86 (1978). In addition, 35 other states are
considering revisions of their sentencing laws. See, Zalman, Making Sentencing Guidelines
Work: A Response to Professor Coffee, 67 GEO. L. J. 1005 (1979).
11. The Virginia Presumptive Sentencing Act was originally offered a:; Senate Bill 180 on
January 20, 1978. It was reintroduced as Senate Bill 777 on January 16, 1979 and was killed
by a vote of the Senate Courts of Justice Committee on February 1, 1979. All references in
this article to the Virginia Presumptive Sentencing Act shall refer to the provisions of S. B.
777 unless otherwise noted.
12. Determinate sentencing is not necessarily mandatory sentencing, which usually contemplates a mandatory minimum sentence for each particular offense or a required sentence
for each specific offense.
13. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 18.2-9 et seq. (Repl. Vol. 1975).
14. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-295 (1975).
15. Virginia Presumptive Sentencing Act § 19.2-316.4 (hereinafter cited as VPSA).
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committed a particularly aggravated offense, the act would provide
for a maximum term substantially longer than that of the ordinary
offense. 8
In addition, the VPSA would create a six member administrative
body known as a sentencing council, charged with the duty of formulating and promulgating sentencing guidelines and a presumptively proper sentence for each specific crime." The council would
also determine which offenses merit community supervision, split
sentences, or periodic confinement.18 The sentencing authority
would impose the presumptively proper punishment as set forth in
sentencing guidelines unless it could demonstrate that another sentence would better serve the goals and purposes of the Act. 9 Once
sentence is pronounced, the court would be without power to suspend any portion thereof."0
The VPSA would require a bifurcated trial in each criminal case."
This procedure, analogous to present Virginia law relating to capital
16. For example, the VPSA provides for a maximum punishment of 12 years in the penitentiary for a Class 3 felony, but the maximum is 18 years for a persistent offender and 24 years
for an especially aggravated offense. VPSA § 19.2-316.4(4). "A persistent offender is a person
who has a least two prior felony convictions for offenses committed within the five years
immediately preceding commission of the instant offense, excluding time spent in confinement." VPSA § 19.2-316.5(A).
An "especially aggravated offense" is:
1. a felony resulting in death or great bodily harm or involving the threat of death
or great bodily harm to another person if,
(i) the defendant knowingly created a great risk of death to more than one person;
(ii) the offense manifested exceptional depravity; or
(iii) the defendant was previously convicted of murder or a felony resulting in death
or great bodily harm or involving the threat of death or great bodily harm to another
person; or
2. murder in the first degree if, at the time the murder was committed, the defendant
committed another murder.
VPSA § 19.2-316.6(A).
Compare VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-10(c) (1975) which provides that Class 3 felonies shall be
punished by imprisonment of not less than 5 nor more than 20 years.
17. VPSA §9 19.2-316.10-316.16.
18. For general provisions relating to community supervision, see, VPSA § 19.2-316.25316.32. Split sentencing is explained in VPSA § 19.2-316.37, and periodic confinement is
provided for in VPSA § 19-2-316.38-316.40.
19. VPSA § 19.2-316.23(A).
20. VPSA § 19.2-316.23(B).
21. VPSA § 19.2-316.22. General procedures for imposing sentence are set forth in VPSA
§ 19.2-316.17 et seq.
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punishment, 22 would separate the trial into two phases-the first
involving the question of guilt or innocence, the second concerning
punishment.
If the defendant is found guilty, a separate hearing would be
conducted in which the trier of fact would set the punishment.3
Prior to the hearing date, a probation officer would prepare a presentence report setting forth such information as the circumstances
of the offense, the defendant's role in the crime, aggravating or
mitigating circumstances, the defendant's prior criminal record,
and past sentencing practices relating to similar crimes. The report
also would contain an analysis and explanation of the sentencing
guidelines applicable to the offense in question.24 At the hearing
itself, the prosecution, the defense, and the victim would be entitled
to present testimony and other information to persuade the trier of
fact either to enhance or diminish the sentence.?
The VPSA would abolish parole, 2 and all powers of discretionary
release would be transferred to the sentencing council. Once the Act
became effective, the parole system would be discontinued; in its
place, a system of good time credits would be established providing
2
for one day of credit for each day served. 1
Provisions allowing a prisoner to accelerate his parole eligibility
or release date by participation in rehabilitative or optional pro2
grams would also be eliminated. 1
22. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 19.2-264.3-264.4 (Cum. Supp. 1978).
23. VPSA § 19.2-316.22.
24. VPSA § 19.2-316.20.
25. VPSA § 19.2-316.22(B).
26. VPSA § 53-250.6.
27. VPSA § 19.2-316.35B. The reason for the retention of good time credits would be to
maintain order in the correctional facilities by providing some reward to inmates who remain
on good behavior. Reductions for good behavior would be forfeited or withheld only in limited
circumstances as a punishment for disciplinary offenses involving violations of institutional
rules. VPSA § 19.2-316.35E. This seems to be in accord with recent federal court rulings such
as Landman v. Royster, 333 F. Supp. 621 (E.D. Va. 1971), holding that, unlike parole,
inmates have a constitutional right not to have good time allowances withheld arbitrarily.
For present statutory provisions relating to good time allowances, see VA. CODE ANN.
§ 53-213 (Repl. Vol. 1978).
28. See VPSA § 19.2-316.35(D).
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THE THRESHOLD ISSUE: Is DISCRETION THE CULPRIT?

No one would argue with the proposition that ideally the law
should provide equal punishment for defendants convicted of the
same crime. Indeed, proponents of the VPSA can point to numerous
cases in which co-defendants received widely disparate sentences for
the same crime, or where two offenders in different localities received widely diverse sentences.
The problem is that, too often, extreme examples are cited as the
rule rather than the exception. Further, the underlying facts often
belie the surface appearance of inequitable sentencing.29 As an illustration, consider a series of recent cases tried in the Circuit Court
of Patrick County. Defendants Shaw, McBride and Payne were indicted in connection with the burglary of an appliance store. Shaw
and McBride were tried by separate juries, and each was convicted
of statutory burglary and grand larceny. Shaw, who actually entered
the building and carried away the merchandise, was sentenced to
three years in the penitentiary.30 McBride, who was 20 miles away
at the time the crime was committed, received an active sentence
of 25 years in prison." Payne, on the other hand, plea bargained and
received an active term of less than 12 months in jail. 2
On the surface, these three cases would exemplify unjustifiable
disparity in sentencing at its worst. However, a closer look at the
facts reveals otherwise. Shaw and Payne went to the store at the
insistence of McBride. McBride planned the crime, counseled the
others on how entry to the building could be made, and provided a
means for disposing of the stolen goods. In addition, he derived the
lion's share of the proceeds of the crime. Circumstantial evidence
served to establish McBride as the central figure of a burglary ring
29. The Virginia Supreme Court in 1970 addressed the issue of disparate sentencing. Codefendants Kirkpatrick and Poole were each tried by jury and found guilty of robbery. Kirkpatrick was sentenced to 5 years in prison, and Poole received a 20 year term. When Poole
attempted to use the disparity to infer prejudicial error, the court noted that he had entered
the motel with a sawed-off shotgun and robbed the clerk. Kirkpatrick stayed outside, and
was convicted as a principal in the second degree. The Court held that "[the disparity in
sentence can be explained by the disparity in conduct." Poole v. Commonwealth, 211 Va.
262, 267, 176 S.E.2d 917, 921 (1970).
30. Commonwealth v. Shaw, No. 6067 (Patrick County Cir. Ct. July 10, 1978).
31. Commonwealth v. McBride, No. 6209 (Patrick County Cir. Ct. Nov. 10, 1978).
32. Commonwealth v. Payne, No. 6069 (Patrick County Cir. Ct. Jan. 29, 1979).
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that operated in five counfies and two states. Unlike Shaw and
Payne, who had no prior criminal history, McBride was a repeat
offender with a lengthy record.
Payne, meanwhile, testified on behalf of the Commonwealth
against both Shaw and McBride, and without his a3sistance, the
chances for conviction of the other parties would have been remote.
Are the results of the foregoing cases justified in terms of the
culpability of the respective defendants? Did the system fulfill its
crime control function? The answer to both these questions is obviously in the affirmative.
This conclusion is borne out by the results of an exhaustive study
conducted by Charles E. Silberman, a director of the Study of Law
and Justice, a Ford Foundation research project. 3 In suggesting that
the traditional judicial process produces results that. are both rational and just, Professor Silberman concludes that "prosecutors
and judges use their discretion to carry out the intent, if not the
precise letter, of the law, i.e., to prosecute, convict and punish 'real
criminals,' while showing appropriate leniency to those whose
crimes are not serious, or who seem to pose no real danger to the
community."u
In answering critics of "disparate sentencing," Silberman points
to the lack of data to support their claim that sentencing is capricious. 3 5 This hiatus can be traced to the failure of the critics to

distinguish between sentencing disparities resulting from philosophical differences between judges, and those which result from
societal attitudes of the community in which the crime is committed. Sentences, of necessity, can and must reflect local attitudes
toward a given crime if the system is to serve any purpose at all.
The apparent disparities in sentencing are often a reflection of the
seriousness which a locality attaches to a specific crime.
The principal flaw of the VPSA is its myopic view of the role of
sentencing. The criminal trial lawyer and jurist recognize that no
two crimes or criminals are alike. The presumptive sentencing phi33. C. SILBERAN, CPnINAL VIOLENCE, CmbuNAL JuSn= (1978).
34. Id. at 285.
35. Id. at 286.
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losophy overlooks this and sees sentencing as an end in itself. However, justice is not something that can be mass-produced; if it is to
have any meaning at all, it must be tailored to the specifics of each
case.
The trial judge is the one most suited to perform the task of
sentencing. He has the experience and knowledge necessary to administer fair sentences, and he is answerable to the citizens of the
locality in which he resides. Most importantly, he has the benefit
of personally observing the prosecution and defense witnesses and
the defendant himself. A sentencing council, far removed from the
scene of the crime, cannot presume to dictate "proper" sentences
without considering these factors. It is doubtful that such a system
could promote justice or improve the capacity of the courts to deal
effectively with crime.
VPSA proposals to eliminate or curtail the use of plea bargaining
should also be rejected.3 Studies indicate that the overwhelming
majority of criminal cases in all jurisdictions, regardless of the size
or location, are disposed of by plea
agreement. Moreover, this has
37
been the rule for over a century.
Contrary to the critics' contention that plea bargaining produces
inequitable results, data assembled by the National Institute of Law
and Research suggests that plea bargaining may actually reduce
crime by reducing the number of acquittals." It offers the prosecutor
the benefit of increased convictions and considerable saving in resources, and benefits the public in reduced incidences of recidivism.
The study concludes that "plea bargaining is an economical routine
for proximating the outcome of an expensive trial. '39
36. VPSA proposals to overcome the force of plea bargaining are based in part on the
recommendations of the NATIONAL

ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS AND

GoALs, COURTS, Standard 3.1 (recommending abolition of plea bargaining) and Standard 3.8
(recommending that guilty pleas not affect sentencing) (1973).
For general provisions governing plea agreements in Virginia, see Rule 3A:11 of the Supreme Court. See also Lilly v. Commonwealth, 218 Va. 960, 243 S.E.2d 208 (1978).
37. R. MoLEY, POLmCS AND CRIMINAL PROSECUTION (1927); Wishingrad, The Plea Bargain
in Historical Perspective, 23 BUFFALO L. Rav. 2 (1974).

38. The results of the study are set forth in Vol. 7, No. 7 of the L.E.A.A. newsletter at 1516 (Sept. 1978). The study analyzed the outcomes of more than 5,000 arrests for various
crimes in the District of Columbia in 1974.
39. Id. at 15.
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It is apparent, both from scientific studies and practical everyday
exposure to it, that the current sentencing system works reasonably
well in administering justice to criminal offenders. We should,
therefore, be slow to change to a system which would circumscribe
the discretionary power of our judges or eliminate community sentiment in the imposition of sentence.
V.

PRACTICAL SUGGESTIONS FOR REFORM

That the present system works well does not mean that it is flawless. Changes in certain aspects of sentencing would enhance the
quality of justice and remedy some of the perceived injustices.
Among the recommended changes:
A.

Sentencing by Jury Should Be Eliminated.

Virginia is one of only a handful of states which provides for jury
sentencing in non-capital cases."0 After passing upon the issue of
guilt or innocence, a jury is then charged with the duty of setting
punishment within the terms prescribed by law.4 '
Unfortunately, the jury is given little guidance in how to go about
executing this charge. The only evidence put before it relates to the
question of guilt or innocence, yet it must use this same evidence
to set the punishment. It is permitted to know little about a defendant's background. It cannot be told of his past record, nor is it
advised about the availability of parole or other early release provi43
sions." It has no power to suspend sentences or grant probation.
40. Other states allowing juries to sentence include Alabama, ALA. CODE tit. 15, § 18-22
(1975); Arkansas, ARK. STAT. ANN. § 43-2306 (Repl. Vol. 1977); Kentucky, Ky. REv. STAT.
ANN.

§ 9.84 (Baldwin, 1978); Mississippi, Miss. CODE

ANN.

§ 97-3-53 (Cum. Supp. 1978);

Missouri, Mo. ANN. STAT. § 557.036 (Vernon, Spec. Pam. 1979); Oklahoma, OKLA. STAT. ANN.

tit. 22, § 926 (West, 1958); Tennessee, TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-2707 (Repl. Vol. 1975); Texas,
Tax. CraM. PRO. CODE ANN. Art. 37.07 (Vernon, Cum. Supp. 1978).
In Virginia, the right to a jury trial is the prerogative of either the Commonwealth or the
defendant. VA. CoDE ANN. § 19.2-257 (1975). Singer v. U.S., 380 U.S. 24 (1965), holds that
the government may constitutionally limit the right of an accused to waive a jury.
41. It has been reported that a defendant has a 16% better chance of acquittal with a jury
than a judge. H. KALvEN & H. ZFmsEL, THE AMEmcm JuRY 58-59 (1966). Depending upon the

jurisdiction, these odds rise or fall on such variables as the quality of the prosecution or
defense, and, more significantly, the demeanor and temperament of thB circuit court judge.
42. It is reversible error for the court to instruct the jury in any manner concerning the good
time allowance, Coward v. Commonwealth, 164 Va. 639, 178 S.E. 797 (1935), or parole,
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In effect, the jury is required to sentence based solely upon the facts
of the case and whatever it can derive about the character of the
defendant during the course of the trial. Even if the jury had access
to this information, it is unlikely that it would possess the legal
sophistication and perception to utilize these facts in a reasonable
manner.4
The trial judge, on the other hand, has the benefit of a presentence report, which he must consider prior to disposing of a criminal

case. 5 Prepared by a trained probation officer, the report provides
important biographical information about the defendant, including
his past record, work history, family background, education, and,

in some cases, a psychological profile. Prior to the imposition of
sentence, copies of the report are given to the prosecutor and defense
Hinton v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. 492, 247 S.E.2d 704 (1978); Jones v. Commonwealth, 194
Va. 273, 72 S.E.2d 693 (1952).
43. But see VA. SuP. CT. R. 3A:25(e), providing that the trial judge may, in any case, if
circumstances so warrant, suspend a jury sentence in whole or in part and place the defendant
on probation. However, as a practical matter, the court will rarely override a jury verdict.
See also Roman v. Parrish, 328 F. Supp. 882 (E.D. Va. 1971).
44. Consider the following statement, printed in a "Letters to the Editor" column, of a
citizen after having served as a juror in a trial in northern Virginia:
My general impressions are that the "average citizen" is generally incapable of
grasping the issues of law in a case as elaborate as this trial was. The responsibility of
sentencing in this case became an element of barter to cause a contrived consensus
among a group of generally confused people.
Personally, I have lost a measure of faith in the jury system as a method of obtaining
"equal justice under law," especially in a case with as many subtleties as the one we
dealt with. However, I recognize that 200 years of judicial precedence assure the continuance, if not the efficacy, of the jury system.
However, the Virginia requirement that juries establish the sentence in a case is an
unnecessary and confounding component of a system that struggles for objectivity and
impartiality. The removal of this responsibility from the jury would allow jurors to
focus more directly on the evidence and points of law involved in the case, and thus
be more likely to render fair and impartial verdicts.
[T]he current jury-sentencing system. . . pressures jurors beyond their capabilities and risks unreasonable jury findings in criminal cases.
Washington Star, Aug. 4, 1978, at A-10, cols. 3-4.
45. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-299 (1975); Rule 3A:25(c)(1). In any case, after a plea or finding
of guilt, the circuit court may direct a probation officer to make a presentence investigation
and written report. The accused may demand and be entitled to a presentence report after a
plea or finding of guilt in the case of a felony. When the proper motion is made, the statute
is mandatory, and failure of the trial court to comply is error. McClain v. Commonwealth,
189 Va. 847, 55 S.E.2d 49 (1949).

910

UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 13:899

counsel, who are then permitted to present other witnesses on the
question of punishment.
Logic dictates that sentencing by the court is clearly preferable
to jury sentencing from the standpoint of the uniform imposition of
punishment. There is no reason to continue to allow juries to sentence while denying them access to information which would have a
crucial bearing on their decisions. The alternative of using the bifurcated procedure with a jury has the drawback of being time consuming. On the other hand, sentencing by the trial judge is efficient and
provides a degree of certainty and uniformity in sentencing which
would be welcomed in our courts."
B. EliminateParoleand, at the Same Time, Limit the Permissible
Rangp of Punishment for any Given Crime.
Under present law, a prisoner sentenced to confinement in a state
correctional institution is eligible for parole after serving one-fourth
of the term imposed.47 Eligibility does not necessarily guarantee
that parole will be granted, however." The decision to grant or deny
parole is left largely to the discretion of the parole board. Although
its decisions must be based upon established standards and criteria,49 it is nevertheless afforded a great deal of discretion in deter46. An ad hoc group of 5 Virginia circuit court judges who studied proposed sentencing
reforms, particularly the VPSA, unofficially recommended the abolition of jury sentencing.
Minutes of Ad Hoc Comm. Studying Methods of Improving Sentencing Process of Criminal
Justice System (June 20, 1978).
47. VA. CODE ANN. § 53-251 (Cum. Supp. 1979). In 1979, the law was amended to extend
the time in which repeat offenders become eligible for parole. Parole was not adopted in
Virginia until 1942. VA. CODE ANN. § 4788c, et seq. (1942). Prior to that time, the only
provision for early release was a good time allowance of one day for each day served.
Interestingly, prior to the institution of a parole system, there was considerable activity
with respect to grants of executive clemency. From 1940-42, the Governor of Virginia granted
706 conditional pardons. However, from 1942-44, only 108 such pardons were granted. Address
by Pleasant Shields, Chairman, Virginia Parole Board to Ad Hoc Comm. Studying Methods
of Improving Sentencing Process of Criminal Justice System (Aug. 9, 1978).
48. From July 1, 1977 through June 30, 1978, 4,994 offenders were considered for parole.
Parole was granted to 1,635 of those eligible, and 3,359 were denied. Letter from Jean F.
Anderson, Executive Secretary, Virginia Parole Board to Circuit Judge John D. Hooker,
member Ad Hoc Comm. Studying Methods of Improving Sentencing Process of Criminal
Justice System (Aug. 8, 1978).
49. See Franklin v. Shields, 399 F. Supp. 309 (W.D. Va.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1037
(1975), holding that as a matter of procedural due process of law, inmates must be afforded
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mining exact release dates. Prisoners are permitted to accelerate
their parole eligibility dates by participation in vocational or educational training, or by demonstrating work habits which project
"unusual progress toward rehabilitation." 0 Parole eligibility may be
further advanced by an inmate performing certain enumerated
"extraordinary" services while incarcerated. 51
Although there is no concrete factual data supporting allegations
of unfairness in the parole system in Virginia, ' the wisdom of discretionary release has been assailed by almost everyone affected by it.-,
Prosecutors complain that the parole board is more concerned
with prison logistics than with the protection of the public, and
often releases dangerous criminals before they have served a sufficient term for their crime. Prisoners complain that uncertainty as
to the exact time to be served makes it difficult to plan for release,
and the lack of adequate guidelines often hinders them in their
preparation for parole hearings. Most importantly, the public is
dismayed when they find that an offender who was given a substantial prison sentence is back in the community a short time thereafter. If he commits further crimes, they blame "the system" for
allowing this to happen.
A preferable alternative to this system would be the implementation of a "flat time" sentencing system. 4 The court would announce
a fixed punishment for the offender, who would then serve the entire
term imposed subject only to good time credits. This procedure
should eliminate unregulated discretionary release by the Board,
protect society by guaranteeing that an offender will serve a reasonaccess to the information and criteria upon which a parole board reaches its decision to grant
or deny parole.
50. VA. CODE ANN. § 53-213.1 (Repl. Vol. 1978).
51. VA. CODE ANN. § 53-220 (Repl. Vol. 1978).
52. State Senator Frederick T. Gray, (D.-Chesterfield County), in hearings on S.B. 180,
seriously questioned allegations that the Virginia Parole Board was arbitrary in it.; decisions.
Minutes of Joint Comm. Mtg. for Courts of Justice of House and Senate Studying Sentencing
in Criminal Cases (June 30, 1978).
53. See, e.g., D. GLASER, EFFcTwFNass OF A PRISON AND PAROLE SYSTEM (1964); D. LnPrON,

R. MARTINSON & J. Wnms, THE EFFcrvF
~ss OF CoRRcTiONAL TREATMENT (1975).
54. The American Bar Association Joint Committee on the Legal Status of Prisoners has
proposed a modified flat sentencing system for approval by the Association. 14 AM. CRIM. L.
REV. 375, 410 (1977).
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able portion of the term imposed, and the retention of good time
allowances would help maintain order in the prison system.
The abolition of discretionary release, however, mandates a corresponding legislative narrowing of the range of penalties for the various offenses. It is a rare case of breaking and entering with the
intent to commit larceny that warrants the imposition of the twenty
year maximum now provided by law. 5 Making the permissible
range of punishment more realistic, particularly in terms of legislatively authorized maximums, together with the present power of the
courts to suspend active jail terms, and other available options, will
provide a fair degree of certainty in the sentencing process. In addition, it will not unduly burden an already overcrowded state prison
system.
C. Collect and Publish Sentencing Information Relating to Each
Category of Crime in the Commonwealth.
It is well established that significant disparity in sentencing may
be found in different parts of the state depending upon its location
and its demographic composition. To the extent that this disparity
results from differing community reactions to a given crime, it
should not be cause for great concern. However, if the distinction
rests solely on the philosophical outlook of the particular judge,
efforts should be made to promote some degree of uniform thinking
among the judiciary.
The dictation of mandatory presumptive sentences would curb
judicial discretion to an extent which would be detrimental to the
system as a whole. As an alternative, a central data bank could
collect information on sentencing from each circuit on a semiannual basis and distribute the results to each judge." This information would include:
a) The category of crime, i.e., robbery, murder, larceny, etc.
b) The number of offenses charged for each category.
55. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-91 (Repl. Vol. 1975). This section further provides for punishment, in the discretion of the trier of fact, for a jail term not to exceed 12 months and/or a
fine not to exceed $1,000. Thus, an offender may receive either no time at all or a maximum
of 20 years.
56. VPSA § 19.2-316.12(4) would require the Sentencing Council to collect and maintain
statistical information relating to sentencing and other dispositions of criminal complaints.
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c) The number convicted in each category.
d) The most severe penalty imposed.
e) The least severe penalty imposed.
f) The median penalty within the circuit.
g) The median penalty for each category of crime in the state as
a whole.
The results of these compilations, upon distribution to the judges,
would serve as "informal norms" to provide some means of imposing
an individual sentence in keeping with the statewide median. The
court would at least have the benefit of this statewide data and, in
considering local norms, could set the punishment accordingly.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The history of Virginia jurisprudence has demonstrated the wisdom of making a careful evaluation of all factors involved before
changing existing laws. Given the lack of concrete date justifying
change, we should be especially cautious before abandoning our
traditional system of sentencing.

